MCFT · Industrials(ship & boat building & repairing) · 10 years of annual accounts filed with the SEC · latest fiscal year ended 2026-06-30
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MasterCraft Boat Holdings, Inc. reported revenue of $348.9 million in fiscal 2026, after growing 0.5% a year over the previous 9 years. Its operating margin narrowed from 16.8% in 2018 to -0.3%. Of the $490.1 million its operations generated over 10 years, 44.1% went to acquisitions and 25.2% back into the business; the share count fell 8.3%. On the accounting screens, it passes 3 of 8 Piotroski tests, its Altman Z'' of 4.91 is in the safe zone and its Beneish M-score is above the -1.78 line; 3 of the six cross-checks between its statements fire.
Revenue, fiscal 2026348.9M+0.5% a year over 9 years
Operating margin-0.3%gross margin 22.9%
Return on invested capital—24.1% on average over 4 years
Free cash flow after stock pay18.3M5.2% of revenue
Net debt ÷ EBITDA—net debt —
Piotroski F-score3/8tests of improvement passed
Is it growing?
Revenue and the operating income it turns into. Growth that does not reach operating income is growth bought with margin.
RevenueOperating income
-200.0M0200.0M400.0M600.0M800.0M
2018Revenue 332.7MOperating income 56.0M
2018
2019Revenue 466.4MOperating income 33.3M
2020Revenue 363.1MOperating income -26.6M
2021Revenue 466.0MOperating income 78.6M
2022Revenue 641.6MOperating income 116.2M
2023Revenue 609.9MOperating income 121.4M
2024Revenue 322.4MOperating income 27.5M
2025Revenue 284.2MOperating income 11.2M
2026Revenue 348.9MOperating income -1.1M
2018201820192020202120222023202420252026
Compound growth a year
3 yrs
5 yrs
9 yrs
Revenue
-17.0%
-5.6%
+0.5%
Free cash flow per share
-40.4%
-10.6%
-6.4%
Shares
-1.1%
-2.0%
-1.0%
Falling shares are buybacks: each remaining share owns more of the company.
Does it earn more than its capital costs?
Margins say how much of each sale is kept; return on invested capital says how much the business earns on the money it needs to operate. Growth only creates value when that return is above the cost of the capital.
Return on invested capitalCost of capital today · 10.2%
-40.0%-20.0%0.0%20.0%40.0%60.0%
2018Return on invested capital 33.1%
2018
2019Return on invested capital 14.3%
2020Return on invested capital -20.9%
2021Return on invested capital 30.7%
2022Return on invested capital 44.5%
2023Return on invested capital 38.0%
2024Return on invested capital 9.1%
2025Return on invested capital 4.8%
2026
2018201820192020202120222023202420252026
Economic profit
Economic profit
-50.0M050.0M100.0M
2018Economic profit 29.3M
2018
2019Economic profit 7.6M
2020Economic profit -48.9M
2021Economic profit 41.2M
2022Economic profit 68.7M
2023Economic profit 68.3M
2024Economic profit -2.4M
2025Economic profit -9.8M
2026
2018201820192020202120222023202420252026
(return on capital − cost of capital) × capital invested: the profit left after paying for the money used. Today's cost of capital is applied to every year, since a past one cannot be rebuilt honestly.
Return on equity
-0.4%
Return on assets
-0.3%
Asset turnover
0.70×
Research & development
2.0% of revenue
Overheads (SG&A)
15.3% of revenue
Is the profit cash, and where does the cash go?
Net income is an accounting opinion; free cash flow is what was left in the bank after investing. Stock-based pay does not leave the bank — shareholders pay it through dilution — so it is shown taken off as well.
Net incomeFree cash flowAfter stock-based pay
-50.0M050.0M100.0M150.0M
2018Net income 39.7MFree cash flow 44.1MAfter stock-based pay 42.9M
2018
2019Net income 21.4MFree cash flow 41.8MAfter stock-based pay 40.1M
2020Net income -24.0MFree cash flow 16.0MAfter stock-based pay 14.9M
2021Net income 56.2MFree cash flow 43.3MAfter stock-based pay 40.4M
2022Net income 58.2MFree cash flow 61.0MAfter stock-based pay 57.5M
2023Net income 68.9MFree cash flow 109.6MAfter stock-based pay 106.2M
2024Net income 7.8MFree cash flow 2.0MAfter stock-based pay -630,000
2025Net income 7.0MFree cash flow 26.4MAfter stock-based pay 23.5M
2026Net income -1.7MFree cash flow 22.4MAfter stock-based pay 18.3M
2018201820192020202120222023202420252026
Where 10 years of operating cash went, 2018–2026
490.1M generated by the business. Each band is its share of that total.
Reinvested in the business 25%123.5M
Acquisitions 44%216.4M
Dividends 0%0
Share buybacks 16%76.8M
Kept, or used to pay down debt 15%73.5M
Over the same years it paid 23.5M in stock. The share count fell 8.3%. 53.3M of the buybacks went beyond offsetting that dilution.
Per share
Earnings per shareFree cash flow per shareDividend per share
$-2.00$0.00$2.00$4.00$6.00$8.00
2018Earnings per share $2.12Free cash flow per share $2.36
2018
2019Earnings per share $1.14Free cash flow per share $2.23
2020Earnings per share $-1.28Free cash flow per share $0.85
2021Earnings per share $2.96Free cash flow per share $2.29
2022Earnings per share $3.12Free cash flow per share $3.27
2023Earnings per share $3.88Free cash flow per share $6.17
2024Earnings per share $0.46Free cash flow per share $0.12
2025Earnings per share $0.43Free cash flow per share $1.60
2026Earnings per share $-0.10Free cash flow per share $1.30
2018201820192020202120222023202420252026
Shares outstanding
Diluted shares
16.0M17.0M18.0M19.0M
2018Diluted shares 18.7M
2018
2019Diluted shares 18.8M
2020Diluted shares 18.7M
2021Diluted shares 19.0M
2022Diluted shares 18.6M
2023Diluted shares 17.8M
2024Diluted shares 17.0M
2025Diluted shares 16.5M
2026Diluted shares 17.2M
2018201820192020202120222023202420252026
How strong is the balance sheet?
Debt is not bad in itself; debt the business cannot service in a bad year is. Net debt is debt minus cash, and below zero the company holds more cash than it owes.
Net debt
-50.0M050.0M100.0M150.0M
2018Net debt 67.2M
2018
2019Net debt 107.9M
2020Net debt 92.3M
2021Net debt 53.9M
2022Net debt 22.3M
2023Net debt 33.9M
2024Net debt 41.9M
2025Net debt -28.9M
2026
2018201820192020202120222023202420252026
Net debt ÷ EBITDA
—
Interest coverage
-5× operating income ÷ interest
Current ratio
1.56 current assets ÷ current liabilities
Cash conversion cycle
91 days collects in 12d, stock 112d, pays in 33d
Three classic screens of the accounts
Each asks a different question of the same statements — is it improving, does it look like a company heading for distress, do the accounts resemble ones that were manipulated. None is a verdict; each shows what moves it.
Piotroski F-score
Is the business improving? Nine yes-or-no tests, this year against last.
3of 8 tests passed
✕ProfitableReturn on assets above zerofailed
✓Cash from operationsOperating cash flow above zeropassed
✕Profitability improvedReturn on assets higher than a year beforefailed
✓Profit backed by cashOperating cash flow above net income (low accruals)passed
–Less long-term debtLong-term debt as a share of assets fell — not reportedno data
✕More liquidCurrent ratio higher than a year beforefailed
✕No new sharesShare count did not growfailed
✓Better gross marginGross margin higher than a year beforepassed
✕Sells more per assetAsset turnover higher than a year beforefailed
Where it misleads: it measures change, not level. An excellent business that stood still for a year scores low; a poor one recovering from a disaster scores high.
Altman Z''-score
Does the balance sheet look like those of companies that went bankrupt?
4.91safe zone
1.12.6
Working capital ÷ assets 0.11 × 6.56+0.72
Retained earnings ÷ assets 0.26 × 3.26+0.84
Operating income ÷ assets -0.00 × 6.72-0.01
Equity ÷ liabilities 3.20 × 1.05+3.36
Where it misleads: buybacks. A company that returns so much cash that its equity turns small or negative sinks the last two ratios without being anywhere near bankruptcy. Banks and insurers do not fit the model at all.
Beneish M-score
Do the accounts resemble those of companies that manipulated their earnings?
-1.24above the -1.78 line
-1.78
Receivables vs sales 2.28+2.10
Gross margin slipping 0.88+0.46
Soft assets 1.39+0.56
Sales growth 1.23+1.10
Slower depreciation 1.49+0.17
Overheads vs sales 1.35-0.23
Profit not in cash -0.06-0.30
Leverage rising 0.78-0.25
Where it misleads: fast growth and acquisitions. Sales growth carries a heavy weight, so a company growing 50% a year scores like a suspect without having done anything. It is a screen from a 1999 study, not an accusation.
Where the statements disagree
Cross-checks between the income statement, the balance sheet and the cash flow for the latest year, each with the benign reading and the worrying one.
Receivables are growing 180% against revenue growing 23%.
Benign
A shift towards larger customers on longer terms, or sales concentrated at the end of the period.
Worrying
Sales are being made on looser credit, or revenue has been booked that may never be collected.
Inventory is growing 170% against revenue growing 23%.
Benign
Stocking up for a launch, or securing supply.
Worrying
Demand is softening; discounts or write-downs tend to follow.
Capital spending (8M) is well below depreciation (14M).
Benign
Mature assets, or a business that has become less capital-intensive.
Worrying
Under-investing: today's profit is being held up by consuming tomorrow's capacity.
What is it worth, under which assumptions?
A company is worth the cash it will generate, brought back to today. This model projects revenue with growth that fades over the years, applies a free cash flow margin, and discounts the result at the cost of capital. Every assumption says where it came from, and all of them can be changed.
Value per share, with these assumptions$2.04discounted at 10.2% a year · 45% of it from after year 10
Type a share price on the left to ask the reverse questions: what growth, what margin or what discount rate that price implies.
What the value implies, in the usual multiples
At this model's value
Price ÷ earnings
—
Enterprise value ÷ EBITDA
2.8×
Enterprise value ÷ revenue
0.1×
Free cash flow yield
52.1%
From cash flows to a value per share
10 years of cash flow, today19.1M
Everything after, today16.0M
The whole business35.1M
Minus net debt-0
What belongs to shareholders35.1M
Divided among 17.2M shares: <strong>$2.04</strong> each.
The projection next to its history
Reported free cash flow after stock pay, then the model's. A projection that looks nothing like the past needs a reason.
ReportedProjected
-50.0M050.0M100.0M150.0M
2018Reported 42.9M
2018
2019Reported 40.1M
2020Reported 14.9M
2021Reported 40.4M
2022Reported 57.5M
2023Reported 106.2M
2024Reported -630,000
2025Reported 23.5M
2026Reported 18.3M
2027Projected 3.4M
2028Projected 3.3M
2029Projected 3.1M
2030Projected 3.1M
2031Projected 3.0M
2032Projected 3.0M
2033Projected 3.0M
2034Projected 3.0M
2035Projected 3.1M
2036Projected 3.1M
2018201920212023202520272029203120332035
Year by year
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
Revenue
331.5M
317.6M
307.1M
299.4M
294.4M
291.9M
291.9M
294.4M
299.3M
306.8M
Growth
-5.0%
-4.2%
-3.3%
-2.5%
-1.7%
-0.8%
0.0%
0.8%
1.7%
2.5%
Cash margin
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
Free cash flow
3.4M
3.3M
3.1M
3.1M
3.0M
3.0M
3.0M
3.0M
3.1M
3.1M
Worth today
3.1M
2.7M
2.4M
2.1M
1.9M
1.7M
1.5M
1.4M
1.3M
1.2M
If the least-known inputs move
Value per share as two inputs change at a time. Neighbouring cells that differ a lot are the conclusion: the value depends on numbers nobody knows to a point.
The discount rate and growth forever
discount ↓ · forever →
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
9.2%
2
2
2
2
3
9.7%
2
2
2
2
2
10.2%
2
2
2
2
2
10.7%
2
2
2
2
2
11.2%
2
2
2
2
2
Year-one growth and the final margin
margin ↓ · growth →
-9.0%
-7.0%
-5.0%
-3.0%
-1.0%
0.8%
1
2
2
2
2
0.9%
2
2
2
2
2
1.0%
2
2
2
2
2
1.1%
2
2
2
2
3
1.2%
2
2
2
3
3
All the inputs moving at once
5,000 valuations, each with growth, final margin, discount rate and growth forever drawn at random around the values on the left (spreads of 3.0%, 2.0%, 1.0% and 0.5%). Not a probability — the spreads are assumptions too — but an honest picture of how wide the answer is.
10th percentile$-1.54
Median$2.07
90th percentile$5.86
$0.00$5.00
Half of the simulations land between <b>$0.21</b> and <b>$4.05</b>; one in ten below $-1.54, one in ten above $5.86.
Does the long run make sense?
3.8×The terminal value prices the business in year 10 at 3.8 times that year's EBITDA.
45%of the value comes from after year 10. The more of it, the more the answer depends on the part nobody can see.
What lenders charge, after the tax saving on interest: 6.67% × (1 − 35.0%) = <strong>4.34%</strong>.
Weighted by how much of each the company uses (book value (no price given)): <strong>10.17%</strong>, the rate every future cash flow is discounted at.
What it has filed lately
The last twelve months at the SEC, most important first: annual and quarterly reports, events, large holders and insiders.
Every Form 4 filed in the last twelve months, read line by line: 7 filings by 7 people. Open-market purchases and sales are counted apart from awards, option exercises and shares withheld for taxes.
Bought on the open market$24,9581 purchase(s) by 1 insider(s)
Sold on the open market—none in the period
Under pre-arranged plans—of the sales followed a 10b5-1 plan set months earlier
Gary W. Rollins Voting Trust U/a Dated September 14, 1994Holder of more than 10%
Other · indirect
79,687
—
—
0
A Form 4 says what happened, when, how many shares and at what price. It does not say why: a sale can be diversification, a tax bill or a plan fixed months earlier, and an award is pay, not a purchase. Nothing here is a reason to buy or sell anything.
Companies like this one
Same SEC industry (ship & boat building & repairing) first, then the rest of industrials.
Accounts from the company's own SEC filings; lines some companies do not report are shown as a dash rather than estimated. The risk-free rate is the 10-year US Treasury yield. A DCF is a way of making assumptions explicit, not a forecast: it states what the company would be worth if the assumptions held. The scores are screens that point where to look, not verdicts. Nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell.