MPLX · Energy(pipe lines (no natural gas)) · 10 years of annual accounts filed with the SEC · latest fiscal year ended 2025-12-31
Mplx LP reported revenue of $9.7 billion in fiscal 2025, after growing 13.8% a year over the previous 9 years. Its operating margin widened from 13.9% in 2016 to 61.1%. Of the $42.3 billion its operations generated over 10 years, 32.1% went back into the business and 11.6% to acquisitions. On the accounting screens, it passes 5 of 7 Piotroski tests and its Beneish M-score is below the -1.78 line; none of the six cross-checks between its statements fires.
Revenue, fiscal 20259.7B+13.8% a year over 9 years
Operating margin61.1%gross margin —
Return on invested capital—
Free cash flow4.1B42.2% of revenue
Net debt ÷ EBITDANet cash635.0M more cash than debt
Piotroski F-score5/7tests of improvement passed
Is it growing?
Revenue and the operating income it turns into. Growth that does not reach operating income is growth bought with margin.
RevenueOperating income
02.5B5.0B7.5B10.0B
2016Revenue 3.0BOperating income 422.0M
2017Revenue 3.9BOperating income 837.0M
2018Revenue 5.4BOperating income 2.0B
2019Revenue 7.0BOperating income 1.5B
2020Revenue 6.9BOperating income 211.0M
2021Revenue 8.0BOperating income 4.0B
2022Revenue 8.9BOperating income 4.9B
2023Revenue 8.7BOperating income 4.9B
2024Revenue 9.2BOperating income 5.3B
2025Revenue 9.7BOperating income 5.9B
2016201720182019202020212022202320242025
Compound growth a year
3 yrs
5 yrs
9 yrs
Revenue
+2.9%
+7.1%
+13.8%
Operating income
+6.6%
+95.0%
+34.2%
Net income
+7.9%
—
+40.4%
Falling shares are buybacks: each remaining share owns more of the company.
Does it earn more than its capital costs?
Margins say how much of each sale is kept; return on invested capital says how much the business earns on the money it needs to operate. Growth only creates value when that return is above the cost of the capital.
GrossOperatingNetFree cash flow
-20.0%0.0%20.0%40.0%60.0%80.0%
2016Operating 13.9%Net 7.7%Free cash flow 5.9%
2017Operating 21.6%Net 20.5%Free cash flow 12.8%
2018Operating 37.0%Net 33.4%Free cash flow 17.6%
2019Operating 20.8%Net 14.7%Free cash flow 23.8%
2020Operating 3.1%Net -10.4%Free cash flow 48.4%
2021Operating 49.8%Net 38.4%Free cash flow 54.6%
2022Operating 55.0%Net 44.2%Free cash flow 47.2%
2023Operating 56.1%Net 45.0%Free cash flow 51.1%
2024Operating 57.5%Net 47.4%Free cash flow 53.2%
2025Operating 61.1%Net 50.9%Free cash flow 42.2%
2016201720182019202020212022202320242025
Return on invested capital
Economic profit
Needs a cost of capital, which comes from the valuation below.
Return on equity
—
Return on assets
11.5%
Asset turnover
0.23×
Overheads (SG&A)
4.6% of revenue
Is the profit cash, and where does the cash go?
Net income is an accounting opinion; free cash flow is what was left in the bank after investing. Stock-based pay does not leave the bank — shareholders pay it through dilution — so it is shown taken off as well.
Net incomeFree cash flowAfter stock-based pay
-2.0B02.0B4.0B6.0B
2016Net income 233.0MFree cash flow 178.0MAfter stock-based pay 188.0M
2017Net income 794.0MFree cash flow 496.0MAfter stock-based pay 511.0M
2018Net income 1.8BFree cash flow 960.0MAfter stock-based pay 936.0M
2019Net income 1.0BFree cash flow 1.7BAfter stock-based pay 1.7B
2020Net income -720.0MFree cash flow 3.3BAfter stock-based pay 3.3B
2021Net income 3.1BFree cash flow 4.4B
2022Net income 3.9BFree cash flow 4.2B
2023Net income 3.9BFree cash flow 4.5B
2024Net income 4.4BFree cash flow 4.9B
2025Net income 5.0BFree cash flow 4.1B
2016201720182019202020212022202320242025
Where 10 years of operating cash went, 2016–2025
42.3B generated by the business. Each band is its share of that total.
Reinvested in the business 32%13.6B
Acquisitions 12%4.9B
Dividends 0%0
Share buybacks 4%1.9B
Kept, or used to pay down debt 52%21.9B
Over the same years it paid 35.0M in stock. 1.8B of the buybacks went beyond offsetting that dilution.
Per share
Shares outstanding
How strong is the balance sheet?
Debt is not bad in itself; debt the business cannot service in a bad year is. Net debt is debt minus cash, and below zero the company holds more cash than it owes.
Net debt
-1.0B-500.0M0500.0M1.0B
2016Net debt -233.0M
2017Net debt -4.0M
2018Net debt 436.0M
2019Net debt -6.0M
2020Net debt 749.0M
2021Net debt 486.0M
2022Net debt 750.0M
2023Net debt 87.0M
2024Net debt 174.0M
2025Net debt -635.0M
2016201720182019202020212022202320242025
Net debt ÷ EBITDA
—
Interest coverage
6× operating income ÷ interest
Current ratio
1.23 current assets ÷ current liabilities
Cash conversion cycle
— collects in 28d
Three classic screens of the accounts
Each asks a different question of the same statements — is it improving, does it look like a company heading for distress, do the accounts resemble ones that were manipulated. None is a verdict; each shows what moves it.
Piotroski F-score
Is the business improving? Nine yes-or-no tests, this year against last.
5of 7 tests passed
✓ProfitableReturn on assets above zeropassed
✓Cash from operationsOperating cash flow above zeropassed
✕Profitability improvedReturn on assets higher than a year beforefailed
✓Profit backed by cashOperating cash flow above net income (low accruals)passed
✓Less long-term debtLong-term debt as a share of assets fellpassed
✓More liquidCurrent ratio higher than a year beforepassed
–No new sharesShare count did not grow — not reportedno data
–Better gross marginGross margin higher than a year before — not reportedno data
✕Sells more per assetAsset turnover higher than a year beforefailed
Where it misleads: it measures change, not level. An excellent business that stood still for a year scores low; a poor one recovering from a disaster scores high.
Altman Z''-score
Does the balance sheet look like those of companies that went bankrupt?
The accounts lack a line it needs (retained earnings, current assets or liabilities).
Beneish M-score
Do the accounts resemble those of companies that manipulated their earnings?
-2.52below the -1.78 line
-1.78
Receivables vs sales 0.97+0.89
Gross margin slipping 1.00 (not reported, set to 1)+0.53
Soft assets 1.00+0.40
Sales growth 1.06+0.94
Slower depreciation 1.00 (not reported, set to 1)+0.12
Overheads vs sales 0.99-0.17
Profit not in cash -0.02-0.10
Leverage rising 0.88-0.29
Where it misleads: fast growth and acquisitions. Sales growth carries a heavy weight, so a company growing 50% a year scores like a suspect without having done anything. It is a screen from a 1999 study, not an accusation.
Where the statements disagree
Cross-checks between the income statement, the balance sheet and the cash flow for the latest year, each with the benign reading and the worrying one.
None of the six cross-checks fires for the latest year: receivables and inventory move with revenue, profit turns into cash, investment keeps up with depreciation, the tax rate is ordinary and debt is moderate.
What is it worth, under which assumptions?
A company is worth the cash it will generate, brought back to today. This model projects revenue with growth that fades over the years, applies a free cash flow margin, and discounts the result at the cost of capital. Every assumption says where it came from, and all of them can be changed.
The SEC accounts lack the lines needed for revenue, free cash flow or the share count, so there is no DCF for this company.
What it has filed lately
The last twelve months at the SEC, most important first: annual and quarterly reports, events, large holders and insiders.
Accounts from the company's own SEC filings; lines some companies do not report are shown as a dash rather than estimated. The risk-free rate is the 10-year US Treasury yield. A DCF is a way of making assumptions explicit, not a forecast: it states what the company would be worth if the assumptions held. The scores are screens that point where to look, not verdicts. Nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell.