BKR · Industrials(oil & gas field machinery & equipment) · 10 years of annual accounts filed with the SEC · latest fiscal year ended 2025-12-31
Baker Hughes Co reported revenue of $27.7 billion in fiscal 2025, after growing 8.7% a year over the previous 9 years. Its operating margin widened from 3.5% in 2016 to 11.2%, and it earned 14.5% on its invested capital in the latest year. Of the $19.1 billion its operations generated over 10 years, 51.9% went back into the business and 28.5% to acquisitions. On the accounting screens, it passes 4 of 7 Piotroski tests, its Altman Z'' of 1.94 is in the grey zone and its Beneish M-score is below the -1.78 line; 1 of the six cross-checks between its statements fires.
Revenue, fiscal 202527.7B+8.7% a year over 9 years
Operating margin11.2%gross margin —
Return on invested capital14.5%-34.2% on average over 5 years
Free cash flow after stock pay2.3B8.4% of revenue
Net debt ÷ EBITDANet cash3.0B more cash than debt
Piotroski F-score4/7tests of improvement passed
Is it growing?
Revenue and the operating income it turns into. Growth that does not reach operating income is growth bought with margin.
RevenueOperating income
-20.0B020.0B40.0B
2016Revenue 13.1BOperating income 457.0M
2017Revenue 17.2BOperating income -284.0M
2018Revenue 22.9BOperating income 701.0M
2019Revenue 23.8BOperating income 1.1B
2020Revenue 20.7BOperating income -16.0B
2021Revenue 20.5BOperating income 1.3B
2022Revenue 21.2BOperating income 1.2B
2023Revenue 25.5BOperating income 2.3B
2024Revenue 27.8BOperating income 3.1B
2025Revenue 27.7BOperating income 3.1B
2016201720182019202020212022202320242025
Compound growth a year
3 yrs
5 yrs
9 yrs
Revenue
+9.4%
+6.0%
+8.7%
Operating income
+37.8%
—
+23.7%
Falling shares are buybacks: each remaining share owns more of the company.
Does it earn more than its capital costs?
Margins say how much of each sale is kept; return on invested capital says how much the business earns on the money it needs to operate. Growth only creates value when that return is above the cost of the capital.
Needs a cost of capital, which comes from the valuation below.
Return on equity
13.7%
Return on assets
6.3%
Asset turnover
0.68×
Research & development
2.2% of revenue
Overheads (SG&A)
8.6% of revenue
Is the profit cash, and where does the cash go?
Net income is an accounting opinion; free cash flow is what was left in the bank after investing. Stock-based pay does not leave the bank — shareholders pay it through dilution — so it is shown taken off as well.
Net incomeFree cash flowAfter stock-based pay
-10.0B-5.0B05.0B
2016Net income 0Free cash flow -162.0M
2017Net income -103.0MFree cash flow -1.5B
2018Net income 195.0MFree cash flow 767.0M
2019Net income 128.0MFree cash flow 886.0M
2020Net income -9.9BFree cash flow 330.0MAfter stock-based pay 120.0M
2021Net income -219.0MFree cash flow 1.5BAfter stock-based pay 1.3B
2022Net income -601.0MFree cash flow 899.0MAfter stock-based pay 692.0M
2023Net income 1.9BFree cash flow 1.8BAfter stock-based pay 1.6B
2024Net income 3.0BFree cash flow 2.1BAfter stock-based pay 1.9B
2025Net income 2.6BFree cash flow 2.5BAfter stock-based pay 2.3B
2016201720182019202020212022202320242025
Where 10 years of operating cash went, 2016–2025
19.1B generated by the business. Each band is its share of that total.
Reinvested in the business 52%9.9B
Acquisitions 28%5.4B
Dividends 27%5.2B
Share buybacks 17%3.2B
More than it generated: funded with cash or new debt -24%-4.7B
Over the same years it paid 1.2B in stock. 2.0B of the buybacks went beyond offsetting that dilution.
Per share
Shares outstanding
How strong is the balance sheet?
Debt is not bad in itself; debt the business cannot service in a bad year is. Net debt is debt minus cash, and below zero the company holds more cash than it owes.
Net debt
-6.0B-4.0B-2.0B0
2016Net debt -742.0M
2017Net debt -5.0B
2018Net debt -2.8B
2019Net debt -2.9B
2020Net debt -3.2B
2021Net debt -3.8B
2022Net debt -1.8B
2023Net debt -2.5B
2024Net debt -3.3B
2025Net debt -3.0B
2016201720182019202020212022202320242025
Net debt ÷ EBITDA
-0.7×
Interest coverage
14× operating income ÷ interest
Current ratio
1.36 current assets ÷ current liabilities
Cash conversion cycle
— collects in 87d
Three classic screens of the accounts
Each asks a different question of the same statements — is it improving, does it look like a company heading for distress, do the accounts resemble ones that were manipulated. None is a verdict; each shows what moves it.
Piotroski F-score
Is the business improving? Nine yes-or-no tests, this year against last.
4of 7 tests passed
✓ProfitableReturn on assets above zeropassed
✓Cash from operationsOperating cash flow above zeropassed
✕Profitability improvedReturn on assets higher than a year beforefailed
✓Profit backed by cashOperating cash flow above net income (low accruals)passed
✕Less long-term debtLong-term debt as a share of assets fellfailed
✓More liquidCurrent ratio higher than a year beforepassed
–No new sharesShare count did not grow — not reportedno data
–Better gross marginGross margin higher than a year before — not reportedno data
✕Sells more per assetAsset turnover higher than a year beforefailed
Where it misleads: it measures change, not level. An excellent business that stood still for a year scores low; a poor one recovering from a disaster scores high.
Altman Z''-score
Does the balance sheet look like those of companies that went bankrupt?
1.94grey zone
1.12.6
Working capital ÷ assets 0.12 × 6.56+0.79
Retained earnings ÷ assets -0.08 × 3.26-0.26
Operating income ÷ assets 0.08 × 6.72+0.51
Equity ÷ liabilities 0.85 × 1.05+0.90
Where it misleads: buybacks. A company that returns so much cash that its equity turns small or negative sinks the last two ratios without being anywhere near bankruptcy. Banks and insurers do not fit the model at all.
Beneish M-score
Do the accounts resemble those of companies that manipulated their earnings?
-2.69below the -1.78 line
-1.78
Receivables vs sales 0.94+0.86
Gross margin slipping 1.00 (not reported, set to 1)+0.53
Soft assets 0.98+0.40
Sales growth 1.00+0.89
Slower depreciation 0.99+0.11
Overheads vs sales 0.97-0.17
Profit not in cash -0.03-0.14
Leverage rising 1.00-0.33
Where it misleads: fast growth and acquisitions. Sales growth carries a heavy weight, so a company growing 50% a year scores like a suspect without having done anything. It is a screen from a 1999 study, not an accusation.
Where the statements disagree
Cross-checks between the income statement, the balance sheet and the cash flow for the latest year, each with the benign reading and the worrying one.
The effective tax rate is 8.8%.
Benign
A favourable geographic mix, or legitimate tax credits.
Worrying
Not sustainable; projecting it forward inflates the valuation.
What is it worth, under which assumptions?
A company is worth the cash it will generate, brought back to today. This model projects revenue with growth that fades over the years, applies a free cash flow margin, and discounts the result at the cost of capital. Every assumption says where it came from, and all of them can be changed.
The SEC accounts lack the lines needed for revenue, free cash flow or the share count, so there is no DCF for this company.
What it has filed lately
The last twelve months at the SEC, most important first: annual and quarterly reports, events, large holders and insiders.
Accounts from the company's own SEC filings; lines some companies do not report are shown as a dash rather than estimated. The risk-free rate is the 10-year US Treasury yield. A DCF is a way of making assumptions explicit, not a forecast: it states what the company would be worth if the assumptions held. The scores are screens that point where to look, not verdicts. Nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell.